【报告人】：Patrick Regan 教授 （University of Notre Dame）

【报告题目】：Political Incentives and Climate Change Policy

【报告时间】：2015年10月15日 上午9点

【报告地点】：主楼6层 能源与环境政策研究中心

【报告人简介】：
　　Patrick Regan (Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1992) studies the role of external actors in managing armed conflict. His work involves evaluating how interventions shape conflict, paying particular attention to the interaction between military interventions and diplomatic mediation in civil wars. He also is interested in the conditions under which opposition protest movements have the potential to escalate to civil war and how external actor’s can influence that process. Regan is the author of three books including “The Politics of Global Climate Change”.

【报告摘要】：
　　Implementing national level political directives seems to be one of the critical roadblocks to confronting climate change. In the US national level electricity production standards, CAFÉ standards, light bulbs all confront state or local level resistance. I seek to figure out how to model local level incentives for implementing national level directives on climate stabilizing policy. Climate mitigation efforts are a quintessential collective action problem, except harder than most to solve. Paying selective benefits does not seem to be a sufficient solution. Carbon consumption is part of the requirements for human existence and therefore the costs of compliance are higher. Using a simple derivative of Olson’s collective action model I use uncertainty and future discounting to account for resistance to implementation in the US. The incentives are in the private good of elections. The incentive structures seem more translucent in China (literature talks about promotion criteria) and I am attempting to figure out how to empirically model the incentives in Chinese policy. I will present the basic model, evidence from the US, and then describe how this might apply to the Chinese political process. Ultimately I seek the help of my colleagues to think through this issue.

（承办：能源与环境政策研究中心）